

## Temas de Estrategia

Joint Force Quarterly (Noviembre 2018)

<b>Ficha</b>	Pikner, Stephan J. 2018 "Complementary Engagement. An American-Led Response to Rising Regional Rivals" <i>Joint Force Quarterly</i> (noviembre) (Washington: National Defense University Press), pp. 04-13.
<b>Autores</b>	Major Stephan J. Pikner, USA, is the Army Strategic Association Secretary for the 2017-2019 board term and is studying at Georgetown University as part of the Army's Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program.
<b>Palabras clave</b>	Unipolaridad, orden mundial, conflictos post guerra fría, política exterior de Estados Unidos, cooperative security
<b>Tema</b>	Nueva estrategia de defensa que involucre mayor participación de aliados y libere de presiones a Estados Unidos.
<b>Argumento</b>	<p>Estados Unidos ha asumido el rol de protector mundial, que le ha generado graves costos, tanto económicos, como simbólicos y humanos. El fin de la guerra fría modificó las estrategias de defensa pasando por diversas concepciones dictadas en los National Defense Strategy (NDS). El artículo nos señala una nueva visión de defensa en que los diversos aliados asumen mayores responsabilidades militares en sus territorios, contando aun con el soporte estadounidense, pero sin ser el mayor actor en un posible conflicto.</p> <p>The unifying logic of this new military strategy is complementary engagement. Complementary engagement hinges on allied investments in their territorial defense, matched with forward-deployed American forces that can be quickly reinforced by globally projected U.S. military power. (Pikner, 2019: 9)</p>
<b>Descripción del mundo</b>	Fin de la Guerra Fria, asumiendo un mundo unipolar: "American-led liberal hegemonic world order," where unrivaled U.S. strength underwrites economic growth and political liberalization through a widely accepted, voluntary, rules-based, but increasingly atrophying system. (Pikner, 2019: 5)
<b>Concepción de guerra</b>	Conflictos regionales que deben ser asumidos por países aliados que se vean afectados, con un soporte estratégico, tecnológico y armamentístico estadounidense.

<p><b>Concepción del enemigo o de las amenazas</b></p>	<p>El autor señala a China, Rusia e Irán como enemigos, que han incrementado sus ambiciones y capacidades, demostrado en intereses regionales:</p> <p>Iran, capitalizing on the power vacuum created by Iraq’s continued instability, involved itself more openly and assertively in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq. Russia flexed its muscles as well by creating and then capitalizing on a series of “frozen conflicts” in regions along its periphery. Some of these manufactured conflicts erupted into open war, such as in 2008 against Georgia and 2014 against Ukraine. Others, namely Transnistria in Moldova and NagornoKarabakh in Azerbaijan continue to linger unresolved. (Pikner, 2019: 6)</p> <p>Pese a las amenazas regionales que significan, Pikner señala:</p> <p>There is no universal ideology, such as Soviet communism, that binds America’s rivals together. Similarly, there is no great project, such as building liberal democracy, to focus U.S. allies. Probes by an adversary in one theater are not part of a coordinated, global scheme to test U.S. resolve, as was often the case in the Cold War. (Pikner, 2019: 8)</p>
<p><b>Fuerzas mencionadas en el artículo</b></p>	<p>OTAN, Rusia, Irán, China, Suecia, Arabia Saudita, Kuwait, Qatar,</p>
<p><b>Los aliados: ¿quiénes son y cuál es su compromiso o tarea?</b></p>	<p>Miembros de la OTAN, Suecia, Japón, Vietnam, Singapur, así como países árabes que a continuación se señalan. Los aliados son la base del complementary engagement, puesto que deben comprometerse en generar un sistema de defensa que pueda satisfacer las necesidades regionales:</p> <p>In recent years, many American allies have “hard balanced” against their more assertive neighbors by building their military capacities. (Pikner, 2019; 6)</p> <p>Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have all increased their spending on sophisticated American-built antimissile systems to defend against Iran, a trend highlighted by the \$110 billion weapons deal struck during President Donald Trump’s 2017 visit to Riyadh. Asian states such as Vietnam and Singapore have dramatically increased their spending on naval and air weapons to balance against China. Even Japan, constrained by its pacifist postwar constitution, is investing heavily in expeditionary weapons platforms such as helicopter carriers. (Pikner, 2019: 6)</p> <p>Sweden, though not a NATO member, has reintroduced conscription and is remilitarizing islands in the Baltic Sea to counter Russian probing. Poland is also investing in territorial defenses and now fields the largest tank force in Europe, apart from Russia. NATO members</p>

	<p>in the Baltics, the likeliest targets of Russian aggression, are developing their forces to counter the subversive gray zone tactics of unmarked soldiers and ethnonationalistic instigation employed earlier against Georgia and the Ukraine. (Pikner, 2019: 6)</p>
<p><b>Metodología para enfrentar las amenazas</b></p>	<p>Aliados asumiendo responsabilidades en mejora de sistemas de defensa, armamento y compromiso en conflictos bélicos, sin perder el apoyo estadounidense. USA pasando a nuevas metodologías, respaldándose principalmente en armamentos de largo alcance y tecnología de punta:</p> <p>The U.S. military must retain and modernize its nuclear forces. Continued extended nuclear deterrence over technologically advanced allies such as Germany, South Korea, and Japan not only protects those states but also dissuades them from developing nuclear weapons themselves in response to a regional threat and possible American neo-isolationism. (Pikner, 2019: 10)</p> <p>Second, the United States should enhance its long-range strike capabilities. These include the Air Force's long-range strike bomber (LRSB), long-range standoff (LRSO) cruise missile, groundbased rockets such as the Army Tactical Missile System replacement, and submarine-launched, conventionally armed missile platforms such as the Virginia Payload Module (VPM). Outsize investment by the United States in these systems has several benefits for both America and its allies. First, these weapons can be quickly deployed across the globe, allowing for efficient centralized management of limited, expensive platforms. Second, their ability to strike deep into enemy territory with conventional munitions holds an adversary's forces at risk, much like Chinese A2/AD capabilities threaten American warships in the western Pacific. Third, these platforms are less threatened by A2/AD systems than aircraft carriers or forward tactical air bases. Finally, and most critically, American control of such weapons reduces the risk of reckless driving by allies, as Washington would have a clear veto over any escalation. (Pikner, 2019:10)</p>
<p><b>Documentos militares citados</b></p>	<p>National Defense Strategy (2010,2015, 2018)</p>
<p><b>¿Cómo se inscribe esta discusión en el tema de nuestro proyecto?</b></p>	<p>La generación de nuevas perspectivas de defensa nos obliga a pensar en un reacomodo militar, que va desde las cuestiones regionales a cuestiones mundiales.</p>
<p><b>Comentarios</b></p>	<p>El autor observa los siguientes riesgos en la aplicación del complementary engagment:</p> <p>First, it assumes sustained military spending by allies, a continuation</p>

	<p>of the current trend. American allies, particularly in Europe, are being pressured to increase defense spending by both Washington and a newly assertive Russia, and complementary engagement gives them a framework to prioritize this spending. [...] Second, although it retains the capacity for unilateral American action, complementary engagement reduces the quantity of forces available for such action. Sustained, large-scale, out-of area missions, even with a coalition of American allies, would be less viable as these forces focus on territorial defense. (Pikner, 2019: 11)</p>
<p><b>Enlace electrónico del artículo original</b></p>	<p><a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-91/jfq-91_4-13_Pikner.pdf">https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-91/jfq-91_4-13_Pikner.pdf</a></p>
<p><b>Persona que elaboró la ficha</b></p>	<p>Alberto Andrés Hidalgo Luna.</p>