

Temas de estrategia

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Ficha	Jakubowski, John Francis “Why Not a Joint Security Force Assistance Command?” <i>Joint Force Quarterly</i> 89 (2 nd Quarter 2018) (Washington: National Defense University Press) pp. 76-79.
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Tema	Necesidad de un Comando Conjunto de Asistencia a las Fuerzas de Seguridad “Security Force Assistance Command (SFAC)”.
Palabras clave	Security Force Assistance Command, education in foreign languages and cultures, language and cultural training, partnering.
Argumento	<p>There is no question that the ability of Servicemembers to communicate and connect on some level with multinational partners, security forces of other nations, and indigenous populations can be a key element of combat mission success” Por ello, “A joint, functional Security Force Assistance Command (SFAC) should manage security force assistance needs of the combatant commanders and have management oversight of language and cultural training requirements across DOD. SFAC should mirror to a significant degree the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute, be jointly resourced, and be structured and staffed to ensure flexible and responsive support to combatant commanders, while at the same time meeting the more enduring, long-term needs of the Intelligence Community. (Jakubowsky, 2018: 77).</p> <p>El aprendizaje de idiomas y la formación de expertos culturales regionales es de utilidad estratégica para las operaciones cívico-militares:</p> <p>...we should recognize that our performance of security and assistance missions of the recent past— specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan—indicate inadequate language and culture training of Soldiers and other Servicemembers. We can do better (Jakubowsky, 2018: 78).</p> <p>Además, hay problemas en las asociaciones o “partnering” entre Servicios, con otras Agencias Federales, con gobiernos locales y entidades privadas porque no han sido obligadas a pensar conjuntamente. Por ello se necesita un “joint, functional Security Force Assistance Command (SFAC)”.</p>
Concepción de intereses estratégicos	Se recalca que “the future national security and economic well-being of the United States will depend substantially on the ability of its citizens to communicate and compete by knowing the languages and cultures of other countries” (Jakubowsky, 2018: 76). Asimismo, el autor cita al presidente Obama: “In the 21st century, military strength will be measured not only by the weapons our troops carry, but by the languages they speak and the cultures they understand” (Jakubowsky, 2018: 76). Y el director de la CIA: Central Intelligence Agency Director Leon Panetta stated, “Language skills are the keys to accessing foreign societies, understanding their governments and decoding their secrets” (Jakubowsky, 2018: 76). Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen stated, “No training is more crucial to the U.S. military than education in critical foreign languages and cultures” (Jakubowsky, 2018: 76).

Fuerzas implicadas en el artículo	Department of Defense (DOD), Government Accountability Office (GAO), Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC), Defense Language Interpretation Translation Enterprise (DLITE), U.S. Naval Postgraduate School's (NPS) Center for Civil-Military Relations. Security Force Assistance Command (SFAC), Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABS).
Metodología para enfrentar las amenazas (eliminar, prevenir, desestructurar, etc.)	<p>Six SFABs are planned, along with a Military Advisor Training Academy at Fort Benning, Georgia. The academy will train Soldiers to handle many postconflict security assistance and civil-military cooperation requirements. Language and culture will be a significant piece of the training. In adapting to better meet the security force assistance missions, the Army and DOD should consider exploring synergies and collaboration across the Services, intelligence agencies, and State Department (Jakubowsky, 2018: 78).</p> <p>El autor recomienda que la "U.S. Naval Postgraduate School's (NPS) Center for Civil-Military Relations" y la "Military Advisor Training Academy", deberían ser "carved out and/or combined together and with DLIFLC to serve as the initial foundation of the SFAC. There ought to be a more focused unity of effort". "Language requirements should not be trusted primarily to contractors". (Jakubowsky, 2018: 79).</p>
Mecanismos o planos de la guerra contra el enemigo o las amenazas	<p>En este caso, el autor critica la forma en que se distribuye e invierte el dinero, y en que se hacen los contratos con empresas para la enseñanza de idiomas y culturas, al interior del mismo ejército norteamericano:</p> <p>The primary beneficiary of Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center DLIFLC efforts are intelligence activities and agencies, not the regional combatant commanders. [...] The Army spent about \$5.2 billion from 2008 through 2012 to acquire translation and interpretation services for various contingency operations. In addition, the GAO has noted that language and culture training to support the needs of contingency operations, predeployment training, and day-to-day military activities are also separately handled by 159 contracting organizations in 10 different DOD components. These activities obligated approximately \$1.2 billion on contracts for foreign language support during the same time period". Y recalca, "instead of strategically assessing future language and culture training needs to meet probable missions, the Army is moving forward with more of the same: contracting for language training and translation services on an ad hoc basis [...] The Defense Language Interpretation Translation Enterprise (DLITE) program is an Army acquisition effort awarding multiple contractors nearly \$10 billion through 2027 to provide interpreting, translating, and transcription services for missions across the globe. DLITE provides contractual coverage for the support of forces engaged in humanitarian, peacekeeping, contingency, and combat operations. It also provides contractual coverage for exercises and cultural familiarity and awareness missions in performance of day-to-day operations (Jakubowsky, 2018: 77).</p> <p>Este contrato de DLITE, es calificado por el autor como una solución temporal e insuficiente para los objetivos de las Brigadas de Asistencia a las Fuerzas de Seguridad, las cuales demuestran la necesidad de revisar el entrenamiento en cultura e idioma con respecto a las misiones que llevan a cabo:</p>

	<p>The reality is that the contract is a temporary solution rather than a focused reassessment of the strategic value of language and culture training. New mission imperatives, highlighted by the establishment of the Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs), demonstrate the need for a strategic relook of security force assistance missions and how language and culture training fit (Jakubowsky, 2018: 78).</p> <p>El Departamento de Estado necesita incrementar la colaboración entre Agencias Federales y “Services”:</p> <p>Part of the problem with the lack of partnering, as it pertains to security force assistance challenges and future language and culture training, is that the Services have not been forced to think jointly. The Army, by and large, owns the security force assistance mission. And as the DOD executive agent of language and culture training programs, it is saddled with an impossible task of coordinating Service unique interests and needs. The Army has all of the responsibility but no means to effectively manage and control the other Services’ language and culture training approaches. Each Service develops its own language training doctrine and educational needs, resulting in duplicity, competing efforts, and overlap (Jakubowsky, 2018: 78).</p>
Documentos militares citados	<p>DOD News, 2009</p> <p>National Security Education Act, 1991</p>
¿Cómo se inscribe esta discusión en el tema de nuestro proyecto?	<p>Nos habla de la necesidad de reorganización y de mejoramiento de las formas de aprendizaje y coordinación que los militares ven al interior de sus filas, para poder asesorar y trabajar con las Fuerzas de Seguridad extranjeras, a partir de sus aprendizajes en Irak, Afganistán y otras experiencias bélicas, para mejorar su desempeño y su comprensión de las realidades culturales ajenas, lo cual, afirman, cobra mucha importancia en su estrategia bélica actual para poder ganar las guerras. Además mencionan la necesidad de revisar y modificar la distribución presupuestaria y sus contratos y relaciones con empresas en su entrenamiento y formación.</p>
Enlace electrónico al artículo original	<p>https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1492105/why-not-a-joint-security-force-assistance-command/</p>
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