

## FICHAS EQUIPO ESTRATEGIA


### **JFQ 90 (julio de 2018)**

<b>Ficha</b>	Black, Charles N., Newton, Richard D., Nobles, Mary Ann y Charles Ellis, David 2018 “u.s. Special Operations Command’s Future, by Design”, <i>Joint Force Quarterly</i> 90 (julio) (Washington: National Defense University Press) pp. 42-49.
<b>Autores</b>	Charles N. Black es Managing Partner de Xundis Global y profesor adjunto en la Joint Special Operations University (JSOU). El Doctor Richard D. Newton, es Course Director en la JSOU. Mary Ann Nobles es analista sociocultural en Ellis Analytics, Inc., mientras que David Charles Ellis es Resident Senior Fellow en la JSOU.
<b>Tema</b>	Modificación en la metodología de planeación en las Operaciones Especiales
<b>Argumento</b>	A través del USSOCOM Design Way (SDW) impulsado en 2015 se tratan de resolver las problemáticas asociadas a la planeación, logística y funcionamiento de las Operaciones Especiales. En busca de un enfoque de resolución de problemas basado en la creatividad, pensamiento crítico y la innovación se establece una metodología basada en 3 pasos: “Appreciate the Context, Define the Problem, and Develop an Approach” (Black, 2018:44)
<b>Concepción de intereses estratégicos</b>	<p>En este caso se ubica como una problemática el carácter recurrente que adquirieron las Operaciones Especiales durante los últimos años y una suerte de mutación que les habría restado efectividad en el periodo:</p> <p>“From 2001–2014, SOF transformed from a force designed for short duration, surgical strike missions, and small, discreet teams building partner capacities with minimal u.s. support to a global network of geographically dispersed forces engaged in long-duration operations.” (Black <i>et al</i>, 2018:46)</p> <p>“From the organizational culture perspective, the SDW team realized that over the course of almost 15 years of constant conflict, the command’s focus was leaning heavily toward the tactical realm. More importantly, though, the staff officers and middle management at the headquarters, components, and TSOCs, only a few of whom come from the core SOF military occupational skill sets, seemed to become mired in a bureaucracy of support that morphed into an end unto itself. The SDW team offered the USSOCOM Design Way to help the SOF enterprise regain the ethos that had made it so successful during the first half of the command’s existence.” (Black <i>et al</i>, 2018:44)</p>
<b>Concepción de guerra</b>	<p>Se trata de una guerra sin fronteras y en la que intervienen fuerzas aliadas de distinto tipo:</p> <p>“USSOCOM has rapidly evolved into a global enterprise with broad joint warfighting, interagency, and international partnering responsibilities.” (Black <i>et al</i>, 2018:42)</p>

<p><b>Concepción del enemigo o de las amenazas (threats)</b></p>	<p>Se señala una mutación de los escenarios de intervención, desde la invasión y ocupación de países por fuerzas convencionales (Afganistán e Irak) a una presencia a nivel mundial y en regiones donde no existe infraestructura y apoyo:</p> <p>“For larger operations, SOF has relied heavily on the Services to provide most logistics and base operating support, especially after the opening days of an operation. This construct worked well prior to the terrorist attacks of 2001 because SOF were able to leverage mature theaters and operate alongside robust conventional forces and capable strategic partners in what was a relatively resource rich and often low threat environment. This reality has now changed with reductions in conventional force structure and the requirement for SOF to support themselves globally in what are usually immature theaters— little to no U.S. presence, infrastructure, or support, for example, Africa, Southeast Asia, Central and South America.” (Black <i>et al</i>, 2018:46)</p> <p>En términos más generales se habla de amenazas híbridas emergentes (emerging hybrid threats).</p>
<p><b>Fuerzas implicadas en el artículo</b></p>	<p>USSOCOM, J4,J5,J6, COCOM, SOCNORTH, OTAN, Fuerzas de Operaciones Especiales de Rumania. Un papel importante en el desarrollo del SDW es la Universidad de Operaciones Especiales Conjuntas (JSOU)</p>
<p><b>Los aliados: ¿quiénes son y cuál es su compromiso o tarea?</b></p>	<p>Fue realizada una capacitación con los cuerpos de Operaciones Especiales de Rumania:</p> <p>“From August 2016 to May 2017, USSOCOM design-thinking facilitators helped Romania develop a solution to transform their national SOF and create a joint command to lead and manage Romanian SOF from its different services [...] Over 9 months, the Romanians used the SDW to conduct seven 1- to 2-week iterations of reflection, research, and critique. In between each group session team members had specific exploration assignments that were then shared when the group got back together.” (Black <i>et al</i>, 2018:48)</p>
<p><b>Metodología para enfrentar las amenazas</b></p>	<p>Este es el principal campo de intervención del Design Way/Design thinking, la planeación de escenarios, logística, modalidades y resolución de problemas para las Operaciones Especiales:</p> <p>“To better address the highly complex challenges of modern conflicts, USSOCOM developed the USSOCOM Design Way (SDW), an approach to problem-solving that encourages creativity, critical thinking, and innovation.” (Black <i>et al</i>, 2018:42)</p> <p>“SDW offered an approach that encouraged creativity, critical reflection, and innovation beyond operational planning in order to address the huge array of complex challenges facing a globally oriented combatant command in the unique position of also fulfilling many of the responsibilities traditionally reserved for the Services.” (Black <i>et al</i>, 2018:43)</p> <p>“The SDW designers rediscovered the inherent challenges facing USSOCOM as a functional combatant command with global responsibilities, but one that remains a hybrid creation exercising some of the responsibilities and authorities of a Service and operating in an environment where negotiation and diplomacy are usually more important than warfighting skills. Because of this unique predicament, USSOCOM wrestled with complex social problems for which JPP (Joint Planning Process) and MDMP (Military Decision Making Process) were inappropriate tools.” (Black <i>et al</i>, 2018:43-44)</p>

The USSOCOM Design Way is comprised of three elements: **Appreciate the Context, Define the Problem, and Develop an Approach**

Figure 2. Elements of USSOCOM Design-Thinking



“Moreover, sdw intentionally adopts a systemic—different from a systematic—view of complex problems. In so doing, sdw recognizes that bureaucratic, organizational, and population-centric activities operate in a world of open systems, not closed ones. This is a crucial distinction because current military planning constructs are based on the theory that military endstates may be achieved through rigorous application of engineering principles, identifying all relevant variables, controlling the variables through proven practices and limiting uncontrollable variables, and then repeating those practices through doctrinally approved processes, like JPP (Joint Planning Process) and MDMP. (Black *et al*, 2018:44-45)

1) Appreciate the Context is, therefore, the most important part of sdw, as it empowers commanders and staffs to explore complex problems from a multitude of perspectives, both internal and, critically, external to the organization. sdw specifically seeks out *divergent* perspectives to better anticipate how organizational, social, cultural, and political interests might respond to the range of potential actions being contemplated[...]The Appreciate the Context phase explores the mental models driving human systems and investigates how changes in structures might affect the patterns and trends that define the character of organizations, societies, and cultural groupings. (Black *et al*, 2018:45)

2) Define the problem: Once the desired future is determined and the obstacles and opportunities identified, a commander and staff are then able to Define the Problem. This statement captures the commander’s revised, comprehensive understanding of the complex problem the staff is being asked to address. The result is a significantly higher likelihood of the staff solving the “correct” problem. (Black *et al*, 2018:45)

3)Develop an approach:Depending on the situation, the approach may take the format of doctrinal commander’s planning guidance (purpose, endstate, operational risk, etc.), an abridged commander’s estimate, commander’s vision, commander’s intent, or a simple narrative. The key element is that the document, in whatever form it takes, is the *commander’s* articulation of the approach the staff should take. For complex challenges, it is nearly always helpful to include both a visualization and a narrative statement to explain how to move the system from the current state toward the range of acceptable futures. (Black *et al*, 2018:46).

<b>Documentos militares citados</b>	White Paper Special Operations Forces, Joint Planning J-5
<b>¿Cómo se inscribe esta discusión en el tema de nuestro proyecto?</b>	El incremento de las Operaciones Especiales por parte de Estados Unidos a nivel mundial nos habla de la mutación en las formas de hacer la guerra. Para ello es necesaria una adaptación de los principios de este tipo de operaciones que ahora se desarrollan en cualquiera de las regiones del planeta distribuidas por el COCOM.
<b>Comentarios</b>	<p>Llama la atención la coparticipación entre las instituciones a las que pertenecen los autores del artículo. También es importante la reflexión que se hace en torno al recorrido de las Operaciones Especiales desde 2001 y la necesidad de replantear su forma de planeación y actuación a partir del Design thinking. La asesoría a las Fuerzas de Operaciones Especiales de Rumania, habla de la influencia de los postulados del USSOCOM.</p> <p>Entre las fuerzas mencionadas en el artículo son señaladas J4, J5 Y J6 que dentro de la estructura del USSOCOM son Directorate of Special Operations Forces acquisition, technology and Logistics (J4); Directorate of Strategy, Plans and Policy (J5) y Directorate of Communications Systems (J6). Consultado en Alvarez <i>et al</i>, 2015, "Special Operation Forces Reference Manual (Fourth Edition)", (Joint Special Operations University: Florida) pp. 174</p>
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