

## Temas de Estrategia

### Joint Force Quarterly 94

<b>Ficha</b>	Kwoun, James S. 2019 "A Framework to Understand and Improve Defense All-Source Intelligence Analysis" <i>Joint Force Quarterly</i> (julio) (Washington: National Defense University Press) pp. 18-25.
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<b>Palabras clave</b>	Inteligencia, Organizaciones analíticas
<b>Tema</b>	Marco de referencia para las organizaciones de inteligencia y sus análisis y planeaciones.
<b>Argumento</b>	Las organizaciones de inteligencia del Departamento de Defensa carecen de un marco de referencia común que explique las diferencias entre los análisis de los tres niveles de guerra. Dicho marco es necesario para las planeaciones de estas organizaciones en el nivel operativo.
<b>Concepción de intereses estratégicos</b>	<p>La realización del marco de referencia necesario para las agencias de inteligencia demuestra varias brechas en la interoperabilidad de dichas organizaciones.</p> <p>First, DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) civilians routinely serve at CCMD JIOCs (Combatant Commands Joint Intelligence Operations Centers) and JTFS (Joint Task Forces) without standardized training on operational processes that are essential to how joint forces plan and execute missions. Second, military officers assigned to DIA for the first time usually have no familiarity with DIA's entire product lines or analytic tradecraft standards. Finally, there are notable challenges when military officers—who grew up learning one intelligence paradigm—are suddenly placed in leadership roles at DIA that require understanding of a fundamentally different paradigm. Conversely, the same challenges exist when civilian analysts are placed in leadership roles in operational headquarters—in particular, JTFS engaged in combat operations—and are making decisions using an intelligence paradigm that is not optimal for their environment. (Kwoun, 2019: 24)</p> <p>Estos problemas pueden solucionarse con un entrenamiento a civiles y militares en las metodologías analíticas, un programa que expanda el tiempo en el que los analistas civiles observan las operaciones militares y equipos de inteligencia que apoyan a los</p>

	comandantes, y la expansión de un programa conjunto de la comunidad de inteligencia (Intelligence Community, IC) para que incluya más tareas en el nivel operacional.
<b>Concepción de guerra</b>	No se menciona como tal, pero se menciona la concepción doctrinaria del Departamento de Defensa sobre la guerra y sus tres niveles: estratégico, operacional y táctico.
<b>Fuerzas implicadas en el artículo</b>	Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Joint Staff J2 Combatant Commands (CCMD) Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOC)s Army's National Ground Intelligence Center
<b>Metodología para enfrentar las amenazas (eliminar, prevenir, desestructurar, etc.)</b>	Anticipación a los desafíos del campo de batalla por medio de la inteligencia al nivel operacional:  For example, the Army's requirement to maintain forces that are globally deployable makes it impractical for many intelligence staffs to prioritize knowledge development. Although the Army regionally aligns its units with geographic CCMDs, the uncertainty of the operational environment makes it difficult to predict the next contingency. Units must prepare for multiple contingencies by practicing processes that are universally relevant across the range of military operations. Furthermore, the doctrinal IPB (intelligence preparation of the battlefield) and JIPOE (joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment) processes are designed to address specific military problems on a local battlefield, rather than broad geopolitical or strategic issues. (Kwoun, 2019: 22)
<b>Documentos militares citados</b>	Joint Publication 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations  Army Field Manual 2-0, Intelligence  Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 3115.17, Management and Oversight of DOD All-Source Analysis  DOD Directive 5105.21, Defense Intelligence Agency  Army Techniques Publication 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
<b>¿Cómo se inscribe esta discusión en el tema de nuestro proyecto?</b>	Vemos la importancia de las actividades de inteligencia y preparación para una operación militar.

<b>Enlace electrónico al artículo original</b>	<a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1914814/a-framework-to-understand-and-improve-defense-all-source-intelligence-analysis/">https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1914814/a-framework-to-understand-and-improve-defense-all-source-intelligence-analysis/</a>
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