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<b>Ficha</b>	Kort, Ryan W. 2019 "Twenty-First Century Nuclear Deterrence: Operationalizing the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review" <i>Joint Force Quarterly</i> (julio) (Washington: National Defense University Press) pp.74-79.
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<b>Palabras clave</b>	Armas Nucleares, Disuasión.
<b>Tema</b>	La capacidad de disuasión nuclear de Estados Unidos
<b>Argumento</b>	A pesar de los cambios en el ambiente operacional, Estados Unidos mantiene confianza en su concepto de disuasión nuclear, lo que representa un riesgo ante el avance de otros países. Dichos cambios son provocados por el desarrollo de capacidades nucleares de países como China, Rusia y Corea del Norte, los cuales fueron hechos mientras Estados Unidos mantenía una estrategia de no proliferación. El autor propone operacionalizar el Nuclear Posture Review 2018 desarrollando conceptos doctrinales y operacionales para integrar y adquirir nuevas actividades y capacidades de disuasión.
<b>Descripción del mundo</b>	Se presenta un contexto geopolítico caracterizado por el avance de las capacidades nucleares de Rusia, China y Corea del Norte.  What academic circles have termed the "Second Nuclear Age" largely describes the nuclear power vacuum created by continued U.S. deemphasis of nuclear operations. (...) Since 2010, despite decades of U.S. leadership to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons on the geopolitical stage, other international actors moved in the opposite direction, presenting an "unprecedented range and mix of threats" that left the United States in an operational nuclear lurch. (Kort, 2019: 76).

<p><b>Concepción de intereses estratégicos</b></p>	<p>Crear nuevas capacidades de disuasión con la operacionalización de la Nuclear Posture Review 2018.</p> <p>...the United States must develop tailored and flexible operational concepts to ensure effective deterrence against a range of potential 21st-century actors of concern. Failure to act decisively and formulate the necessary concepts and associated capabilities to operationalize this strategy will create gaps in the U.S. extended deterrence umbrella, which will leave allies vulnerable to coercion and increase the likelihood of a nuclear exchange. Bold action now will not only mitigate political and military risk but also present the United States with opportunities to engage with actors of concern from a position of strength to reduce the risk of miscalculation and escalation. (Kort, 2019: 77).</p>
<p><b>Concepción de guerra</b></p>	<p>Convencional al tratarse de posibles conflictos con adversarios cercanos (near-peer competitors).</p>
<p><b>Concepción del enemigo o de las <i>amenazas</i> (threats)</b></p>	<p>China, Rusia y Corea del Norte. Los tres países han desarrollado armas nucleares, y Rusia representa la mayor amenaza:</p> <p>Russia is the only true existential threat to the United States and perceives it has advantages in nuclear posture due to its large, varied nuclear forces and escalate-to-deescalate doctrine. As such, it remains the principal actor of concern over the near-to mid-term. (Kort, 2019: 78).</p> <p>Mientras que China representa un reto a Estados Unidos en tanto no se conoce la capacidad y calidad exacta de su arsenal.</p> <p>Largely shrouded in ambiguity, China's expanding nuclear deterrence doctrines and capabilities pose a serious strategic challenge for how the United States conducts nuclear deterrence. (Kort, 2019: 77).</p> <p>Y Corea del Norte es un peligro para la región de Asia del Este.</p> <p>The United States spent the better part of the last two decades attempting to end North Korea's nuclear weapons program through sanctions, frameworks/agreements, and United Nations Security Council resolutions, which all sought to coax or coerce North Korea into arms reduction in exchange for goods, energy, and food. In each instance, North Korea balked and restarted its programs with limited repercussions. If left unchecked, North Korea will continue to threaten the East Asia region and perhaps one day the United States itself. (Kort, 2019: 77).</p>
<p><b>Fuerzas implicadas en el artículo</b></p>	<p>OTAN</p>

<p><b>Los aliados: ¿quiénes son y cuál es su compromiso o tarea?</b></p>	<p>Se menciona a los países de la OTAN, los cuales deben trabajar con Estados Unidos para contrarrestar la amenaza que Rusia representa.</p> <p>The United States and NATO must demonstrate the capability to react proportionally to potential Russian first use. The advantage of integrating nuclear weapons planning into a broader variety of exercises will ensure proficiency within the force and equip U.S. and NATO leaders with a better understanding of escalation dynamics. In addition, the expansion of exercises would signal to Russia that NATO maintains the broad resolve required to employ nonstrategic nuclear weapons to protect collective interests. Incorporating dual-capable aircraft as nonstrategic nuclear weapons platforms into traditionally land-centric marquee exercises such as Atlantic Resolve will build readiness and reassure allies. (Kort, 2019: 78).</p>
<p><b>Metodología para <i>enfrentar</i> las amenazas</b></p>	<p>Disuasión. En el caso de Rusia con la realización de ejercicios militares que incluyan a la OTAN. Para China una estrategia de inteligencia debido a la secrecía que mantiene en sus programas nucleares, además de estabilizar la relación entre los dos países. Y en el caso de Corea del Norte, el despliegue de misiles balísticos en la región para demostrar que puede neutralizar cualquier amenaza nuclear norcoreana.</p>
<p><b>Documentos militares citados</b></p>	<p>Nuclear Posture Review 2018</p> <p>Joint Operation Environment 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World</p> <p>Joint Defense Capabilities Study: Improving DOD Planning, Resourcing and Execution to Satisfy Joint Capabilities</p>
<p><b>¿Cómo se inscribe esta discusión en el tema de nuestro proyecto?</b></p>	<p>Por medio de la permanencia de las capacidades nucleares y el uso de la disuasión nuclear como un mecanismo entre las grandes potencias militares en caso de un conflicto entre estados.</p>
<p><b>Enlace electrónico al artículo original</b></p>	<p><a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1912991/twenty-first-century-nuclear-deterrence-operationalizing-the-2018-nuclear-postu/">https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1912991/twenty-first-century-nuclear-deterrence-operationalizing-the-2018-nuclear-postu/</a></p>
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