

Temas de Estrategia

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Ficha	Delgado, Jose L. 2019 "Venezuela, A "Black Swan" Hot Spot: Is a Potential Operation in Venezuela Comparable to Operation Just Cause in Panama?" <i>Military Review</i> (enero-febrero) (Kansas: Army University Press) pp. 93-103
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Palabras clave	Venezuela, Intervención militar
Tema	La posibilidad de una operación militar en Venezuela
Argumento	Venezuela presenta un escenario de un posible "cisne negro" (eventos inesperados de gran magnitud y consecuencias) en el que las acciones que tome Nicolás Maduro en la disputa territorial con Guyana pueden llevar a una intervención militar por parte de estados Unidos.
Concepción de intereses estratégicos	Aparece con especial énfasis el petróleo. Se menciona por una parte que desde el triunfo de Hugo Chávez en 1998 se cancelaron grandes contratos petroleros con ExxonMobil y ConocoPhillips. La declaración de Nicolás Maduro en 2015 sobre la soberanía del Esequibo preocupa directamente a los intereses de Estados Unidos y ExxonMobil, empresa con la cual Guyana descubrió grandes depósitos de petróleo en aguas profundas. "As oil revenues have continued to fall, the economic unrest continues unabated. One result is that Venezuela has ostensibly been considering a military incursion into Guyana." (Delgado: 2019, 94-95) También se menciona el éxodo de venezolanos a distintos países de América Latina y la situación económica del país. Igualmente se deja ver que la opción de una intervención militar en Venezuela no es nueva, sino que existe desde 1998. "Foreign military force as a potential solution to "save" Venezuela has been a topic of discussion since Chávez took power in 1999. Calls for military intervention were also given a boost by U.S. President Donald Trump's statement in August 2017, which stated that the United States was considering a military option in Venezuela." (Delgado: 2019, 96)
Concepción de guerra	Una intervención en Venezuela tendría varios aspectos a considerar. Por un lado se menciona que no podría ser una operación como la Operation Just Cause (OJC) en 1989 en Panamá, pues en Venezuela hay un ejército mucho más grande y equipado, además de que Estados Unidos no tiene bases militares en Venezuela. Se trataría de una guerra convencional entre estados con la posibilidad de un desemboque en una guerra asimétrica que se prolongue años: "In stark contrast, Venezuela has 115,000 troops, in addition to tanks and fighter jets. It also has thirty million people, about 20 percent of whom still support the Maduro government. These supporters have an ideology—anti-

	<p>imperialist socialism—that serves to unify their efforts in coordinated responses to security challenges and explains Maduro’s political resilience to outside pressures. Venezuelan leaders have also been preparing for asymmetrical warfare for more than a decade. And, there is no chance that countries in the region would participate in an effort to topple Maduro.” (Delgado: 2019, 97)</p>
<p>Concepción del enemigo o de las amenazas (threats)</p>	<p>Se trata de un enemigo con ideología antiimperialista, socialista y antiestadounidense.</p> <p>“Additionally, the Venezuelan military and its geography, doctrine, and capabilities are largely unfamiliar to U.S. forces—with the notable exception of U.S. Southern Command—which would prospectively be tasked with this mission. If U.S. forces launch an operation into the heavily built-up areas in Caracas, or some of its other outlying areas, aside from having to deal with Venezuela’s conventional forces, they will likely face stiff, armed resistance from irregular forces and opposition in multiple forms from crowds sympathetic to Maduro and his political ideology, including armed uprisings as well as passive popular resistance.” (Delgado: 2019, 99)</p>
<p>Fuerzas implicadas en el artículo</p>	<p>U.S Army, SouthCom, Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana (Venezuela)</p>
<p>Los aliados: ¿quiénes son y cuál es su compromiso o tarea?</p>	<p>Colombia, Brasil y Guyana. Los primeros dos como aliados de Estados Unidos podrían llevar a cabo una ofensiva contra Venezuela en el marco de guerra entre estados.</p> <p>“Seizing even a small part of territory west of the Essequibo River—the Venezuelan objective, as reported by <i>O Antagonista</i>—would likely trigger heavier U.S. sanctions or direct intervention from the United States or its regional allies like Colombia and Brazil.” (Delgado: 2019, 95)</p>
<p>Metodología para enfrentar las amenazas</p>	<p>Dado el apoyo del que goza Maduro, se debe buscar una preparación para que la operación no se prolongue. Se propone así operaciones con fuerzas de coalición, equipadas, con preparación la guerra urbana (urban warfare), operaciones de estabilización y con enfoque interagencia.</p> <p>“The hybrid nature (urban, jungle, maritime) of the environment in Venezuela will almost certainly challenge an expeditionary force tasked with military operations. Although great technological advancements have been made since OJC, these technological improvements have not been applied by U.S. forces in the urban and jungle environments prevalent in either Venezuela or Guyana.” (Delgado: 2019, 99)</p> <p>“In the type of environment described in this article, military forces should not operate independently but as a part of a larger joint, interagency, and frequently multinational effort. Military leaders are responsible for planning, integrating, and executing their operations within this larger effort where integration often involves efforts to exercise, inform, and influence activities with joint, interagency, and multinational partners, as well as efforts to conform military capabilities and plans to larger objectives that are often aligned with strategic and national-level goals.” (Delgado: 2019, 100)</p>
<p>Mecanismos o planos de la guerra contra el enemigo o las amenazas</p>	<p>Antes de iniciar una operación militar en Venezuela se debe considerar que el ejército de Estados Unidos no está entrenado para la guerra urbana, además de desconocer por completo el territorio venezolano, por lo que sería necesario entrenamiento</p> <p>“A conflict characterized by urban combat, a complex civilian presence, and the resultant humanitarian demands would require careful planning, training, and execution. Although the United States could easily overpower</p>

	the smaller Venezuelan combatant forces, the tactics, techniques, and procedures that U.S. combatant units employed in other battlefield scenarios and environments may fall flat in Venezuela and unnecessarily prolong combatant and stabilization operations.” (Delgado: 2019, 101)
¿Cómo se inscribe esta discusión en el tema de nuestro proyecto?	Por medio del caso venezolano, en el que se ha situado el centro de las ofensivas estadounidenses en el continente y donde la posibilidad de una intervención militar por parte de Estados Unidos se ha vuelto muy probable.
Enlace electrónico al artículo original	https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/Jan-Feb-2019/Delgado-Venezuela/
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