

## Temas de estrategia

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<b>Ficha</b>	O’Shaughnessy, Terrence J., Strohmeier, Matthew D., and Forrest, Christopher D., 2018 “Strategic Shaping: Expanding the Competitive Space” <i>Joint Force Quarterly</i> 90 (3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter 2018) (Washington, National Defense University Press) pp. 10-15.
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<b>Tema</b>	Utilidad y definición de la estrategia operativa coercitiva denominada “Strategic Shaping” para disuadir el uso de la fuerza de los adversarios y obligarlos a tomar otra salida u otra vía de resolución de conflictos, también para adquirir una posición de ventaja con relación a los adversarios.
<b>Palabras clave</b>	Strategic Shaping. Competitive space. Coercion. Coercitive effects. Cognitive domain of warfare. Great power competition. Gray Zone warfare.
<b>Concepción de intereses estratégicos</b>	<p>Para mantener una ventaja militar duradera, la Defensa de Estados Unidos debe crear nuevas estrategias y conceptos que expandan el espacio competitivo para disuadir a las grandes potencias de escalar los conflictos. Para enfrentar los retos que presentan las grandes potencias (Rusia y China), necesitan saber actuar en la “Zona Gris” que existe entre en “tiempos de guerra” y “tiempos de paz”, para ello necesitan “evolve from a focus on attrition and material factors to one of perception and cognitive factors”.</p> <p>“The raison d’être of the military is to apply force against an opposing military to produce a desired military and political endstate, but if coercion is fundamentally psychological in nature and is most effective when integrated across the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements, how does the military best present forces to achieve coercive effects when it is not <i>at war</i>? Such a planning shift may require the U.S. defense establishment to adjust its paradigms on the effective use of military force”. “Understanding an adversary’s intentions and war paradigm allows for the development of a counter strategy, one that often must include competition below the threshold of conflict. This is the void into which Strategic Shaping takes the first of many steps to come”.</p> <p>“We argue for shifting our coercive strategy paradigms from attrition toward cognition—starting with adversary beliefs and perceptions and then considering operational capabilities. From the perspective of today’s antiaccess/area-denial operational environment and great-power use of Gray Zone warfare, competitive overmatch must start from an asymmetric perspective, applying strengths to weaknesses. The wars of tomorrow need to operate within the cognitive domain and with the kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities that can be brought to bear to directly influence adversary choice selection”. “The objective is to create a sharp deterrent effect by removing the adversary leadership’s sense of control of the crisis or conflict”.</p>

<p><b>Concepción de guerra</b></p>	<p>Competencia entre grandes potencias, en que la guerra y la coerción se expande hacia nuevos frentes “deliberately blurring lines between civil and military goals”. Por eso, “the joint force, as part of a whole-of-government approach, must transition from “wars of attrition to wars of cognition.”To achieve this approach, military strategists must rethink how military force is employed in crisis and conflict, while recognizing the de facto blurring of those lines by our strategic competitors”. La estrategia de guerra debe considerar el “ámbito cognitivo de la guerra” y dirigirse a producir efectos no kinéticos que modifiquen el curso de la acción, decisión y expectativas de los adversarios: “Operational planning and strategy must move beyond current paradigms and institutional processes to maintain relevance in a time of great-power competition. Such efforts must consider first the cognitive domain of warfare and integrate whole-of-government actions to produce nonkinetic effects that shock an adversary’s strategic expectations” Estos efectos no kinéticos se basan en una eficaz programación del tiempo y la velocidad de la acción “These effects rely greatly on timing and tempo to maximize the deterrent effect. This rapidity of action would require a precoordinated Strategic Shaping plan at the level of the National Security Council to effectively integrate the arms of government and to allow for rapid approval and implementation in crisis”.</p>
<p><b>Concepción del enemigo o de las amenazas (threats)</b></p>	<p>China y Russia son los competidores o adversarios estratégicos que explotan sus ventajas más allá de los conflictos armados, y borran la línea entre objetivos militares y civiles. “China and Russia as strategic competitors who exploit advantages below the threshold of armed conflict to reach their strategic objectives. [...] These actions, broadly termed <i>hybrid warfare</i>, as “adversarial competition with a military dimension short of armed conflict””.</p>
<p><b>Fuerzas implicadas en el artículo</b></p>	<p>National Security Council Departments of State and Commerce Navy , Air Force</p>
<p><b>Metodología para enfrentar las amenazas (eliminar, prevenir, desestructurar, etc.)</b></p>	<p>Modificar las percepciones y expectativas de los adversarios es central, y “battles are won by influencing the minds of humans. By focusing on how to best influence adversary perceptions and expectations, a Strategic Shaping approach is better equipped to deter adversary coercion and prevent escalation by instilling adversary doubt in the effectiveness of a military course of action”. “Strategic Shaping” es una estrategia de coerción, busca complicar los cálculos y las intenciones estratégicas de los adversarios, confundirlos, hacerlos perder su sensación de control, producir incertidumbre y disuadirlos de llegar al conflicto armado. “Strategic Shaping is a coercive strategy that applies rapid, whole-of-government strategic actions to present multiple, complex dilemmas to an adversary’s leadership and thereby removes their sense of control, deterring them from military conflict. Where pure cost imposition and denial strategies attempt to influence adversary operational capabilities by destroying or dislocating fielded forces, Strategic Shaping directly targets an adversary’s strategy to rapidly confound his ability to control the boundaries of a crisis and instill doubt in the efficacy of continued military action. The intent is to reduce the adversary’s confidence in his strategy, to create the sense that he has overreached, and to turn his focus to political objectives that now appear to be at risk. By exacerbating uncertainty, Strategic Shaping strives to deter the use of force in crisis and compel an off-ramp in conflict. But if forced to fight, Strategic Shaping also postures forces globally to fight from a position of advantage. Strategic Shaping targets adversary strategic intentions, applying</p>

	<p>U.S. strengths to confound those intentions for a deterrent effect”.</p> <p>“Strategic Shaping” tiene tres elementos centrales para que “the United States can strive to impact strategic perceptions”:</p> <p>1) Presentar al adversario múltiples dilemas que degraden la sensación de control de los líderes del adversario: “creation of rapid, simultaneous dilemmas that applies during the crisis space before an adversary selects a military course of action to achieve his aims. Specifically, the United States needs to consider how its adversary expects the crisis to unfold, and in particular how the Nation will respond, and then take actions that confound these expectations. For example, in evaluating a military option, adversary political leadership often seeks assurances from the military that lower level provocations will not result in a crisis or conflict that may put other strategic political goals at risk. If, during a growing crisis, the United States executes concise whole-of-government actions targeted against varied vulnerabilities beyond the immediate issue—to include geopolitical weaknesses, internal political rivalries, national infrastructure challenges, economic dependencies, and geographic limitations—this may cause the adversary to reassess the risks of its approach. Faced with a significant deviation between expectations and reality, doubt and risk aversion increase, sense of control and confidence decreases—all delaying or even preventing the adversary from continuing along his planned course”.</p> <p>2) Incrementar la complejidad de la situación haciendo dudar a los líderes del adversario sobre sus propias capacidades. “Movement and posturing of forces to positions that can hold at risk adversary weaknesses with the U.S. strength of global power projection. The movement of these forces, while effectively setting the theater with required posture, also multiplies the first element’s effects of multiple dilemmas. As the Departments of State and Commerce take coordinated actions with the adversary’s bordering nations, the movement of naval and air forces to posture against adversary weaknesses creates additive dilemmas. These challenges increase if American forces can stage in third-party nations, elevating the political cost of in-conflict targeting decisions and thereby their go-to-war calculus. These actions exacerbate the cognitive sense of loss of control and confounded expectations. Most importantly, if the adversary chooses conflict, these globally postured forces allow the United States to respond with multidomain military force from a position of advantage against adversary weaknesses”.</p> <p>3) Reaccionar globalmente en vez de hacerlo localmente, aprovechando y enfatizando las fortalezas de Estados Unidos frente a las debilidades del adversario. “The third element of Strategic Shaping is the display of asymmetric military capability to instill doubt in the success of the use of force in the minds of adversary political leadership and applies in late crisis and into conflict. Rather than reducing the adversary leadership’s sense of control of the situation, this element seeks to erode their assumptions of military capability and the effectiveness of their forces against the United States. In combination with the previous elements, the Nation would rapidly demonstrate previously undisclosed asymmetric military capabilities. The more that demonstrations of capability mask the actual technology or platform, the greater the doubt created in the minds of the political leadership. As the interwar strategist J.M. Speight stated of cognitive effects of new technology, “the mystery of airpower is half its power.”</p> <p>Velocidad y sincronización son claves para crear el efecto cognitivo de las acciones, por ello, “a Strategic Shaping approach must be thoroughly</p>
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	<p>planned and precoordinated at the highest levels of government". Finalmente, "central to this coordinated response is the need for implied reassurance to the adversary that if he ceases the coercive military action, the United States will remove all corresponding pressure. This reassurance may come as direct messaging to the adversary leadership or through the careful choice of actions that can be quickly reversed and that can minimize lasting political impact, providing the adversary with off-ramps that minimize international and domestic fallout. In this way, the coercive effect is achieved".</p>
<p><b>Mecanismos o planos de la guerra contra el enemigo o las amenazas</b></p>	<p>Mientras en el pasado bastaba con la superioridad militar mundial que poseía Estados Unidos, "In the decades since <i>Operation Desert Storm</i>, however, the Nation has increasingly relied on technological dominance, ceding quantitative military superiority to these competitors. This strategy has proved effective against countries and nonstate actors over which the United States still retains an asymmetric military advantage". Sin embargo, esta ventaja puede no ser tal, por los avances militares de China y Rusia, particularmente en sus regiones adyacentes. Por eso se necesita la "Strategic Shaping", que directamente apunta a las estructuras incentivadoras y de toma de decisión del enemigo. Se trata de "deter potential enemies by denial, convincing them that they cannot accomplish objectives through the use of force or other forms of aggression." Solamente mediante un cambio en el campo cognitivo se puede tener éxito en la coerción ("deterrence and compellence") hacia los competidores. "Coercion is the threat of damage in order to convince a state to yield or comply with one's demands or desires. Both <i>deterrence</i> and <i>compellence</i> are forms of coercion; deterrence is the deployment of military power so as to be able to prevent an adversary from doing something that one does not want him to do, while compellence is the deployment of military power so as to be able either to stop an adversary from doing something that he has already undertaken or to get him to do something that he has not yet begun. The success of either form of coercion relies on the capability to inflict unacceptable costs, communication of the threat, and the credibility of the threat".</p>
<p><b>Documentos militares citados</b></p>	<p>National Security Strategy 2017 National Defense Strategy 2018 Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 2017</p>
<p><b>¿Cómo se inscribe esta discusión en el tema de nuestro proyecto?</b></p>	<p>Contribuye a entender el ámbito de la guerra (cognitive warfare) en el que se centrará Estados Unidos cuando se trate de la competencia "en tiempos de paz" con las grandes potencias (Rusia y China), su forma de enfrentarlas, su estrategia disuasiva y coercitiva para construir hegemonía mundial.</p>
<p><b>Comentarios</b></p>	<p>En el artículo se señala que esta estrategia de guerra ha sido aplicada en el Pacífico: "Pacific Air Forces has applied the Strategic Shaping strategy to the Pacific theater, and the resulting concept of operations is available".</p>
<p><b>Enlace al documento original</b></p>	<p><a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-90/jfq-90_10-15_OShaughnessy-et-al.pdf?ver=2018-04-11-125441-307">https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-90/jfq-90_10-15_OShaughnessy-et-al.pdf?ver=2018-04-11-125441-307</a></p>
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